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Teachers should have
expertise in a given subject area, so that they will have a general
understanding of the construction of knowledge and theory. In addition, teachers should understand the subject
disciplines that they teach.
Along with the
Bachelor of Education after-degree that I will earn by April 2001, my previous
degree is a Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy.
The pursuance and completion of the Philosophy degree has brought me
into contact with a wide variety of courses and provided me with a variety of
skills. I can count among my focal
areas: history, politics, ethics and the study of language (or
linguistics). As a student of critical
theory, I have been exposed to the Philosophy of Science, the Philosophy of
Sociology and the Philosophy of History.
Central to my studies were the principles of philosophical investigation,
which contain several skills and attributes:
Ø
Critical analysis
Ø
Reflective self-analysis
Ø
Charity (a principle of debating)
Ø
Rhetoric
Ø
Interpretation (Hermeneutics)
Ø
Moral adjudication
Artefact One
Wittgenstein would be very much in agreement with the
spirit of Heidegger's 'Way' as it involves a journey that takes place through
language itself. Heidegger's 'Way' does
not treat language as a thing that can be studied objectively, but as part of
our everyday lives indeed a part of our very selves and thus something from
which we can never separate for objective study. Wittgenstein does not by any means seem in complete agreement with
Heidegger. The meaning of terms within
our normal language games is just as far as we need to go. To think there is a reason to go beyond
these simple practical understandings that we have is a mistake -- for what is
the use of removing a word from the language game in which it was learned. Changing word meanings from their creche
understandings derived through everyday life experience is simply wrong-headed
thinking. In doing this we become
enmeshed in problems that exist because of a misunderstandings and grammatical
error. To seek out the essence of a
language is a theoretical journey. The
goal is just as theoretical as the journey and just as insubstantial as a ghost.
'Essence' from the Houghton Mifflin Canadian
Dictionary: The quality or qualities of
a thing that give it its identity; the intrinsic or indispensable properties of
a thing: "Government and Law, in
their very essence, consist of restrictions on freedom" (Betrand Russell). A politically loaded definition to say the
least. Yet, a definition which
beautifully delimits the theoretical underpinnings of the word in
question. The essence of language is
what H hopes to uncover in his Way to language, but he does not ask the
question that might readily come to W's mind from the beginning -- how is the
essence of language an important question at all?
Essence as a means of grappling with a thing or idea
is an attempt to reduce observations about that thing to a simple readily
understandable model. We use the term
'essence' to help us understand what is most salient or most important about a
given object or group of things. Thus
the essence becomes a model that can be played with and observed in simplicity
and in motion (so to speak). This model
allows us to test ideas and make further observations that would not have been
possible because of the natural complexity or depth of the thing being
studied. This reduction of a thing to
its essence is something we do all of the time everyday and as such we do not
think about it as a process of simplification for the purposes of
observation. We think of this process
not at all. One of the hints of the
reality of this is that we find ourselves in a way of life of language games
that uses essence as an everyday word, a word we use without question as a
means of analysing the world around us.
To divine the essence of something is to fabricate a
theory about that thing based on whatever we consider to be the most relevant
features of its identity or its most salient properties. The reason we might want to readily accept
the line of questioning that Heidegger explores in his Way-making of language
is because we are unaware of the immensely theoretical nature of the
application of ideas like essence. Heidegger
does not knowingly tread into this theoretical realm any more than Wittgenstein
does but concepts like induction and essence are inherently unreflective to
us. Through a careful study of the
language games in which our community everyday takes part we may heighten our
awareness of the hidden assumptions that are an inescapable part of everyday
language and are thus almost completely unobservable and inherently
unquestionable (p113W). Here I make the
analogy between W's description of induction and our use of 'essence'. It is not that theoretical frameworks like
'essence' are inherently bad they are merely dangerous because we are not
always fully aware of the assumptions we make when using them.
H is clearly aware of the dangers of grasping language
theoretically as a particular instance of this or that universal as a general
notion like energy, activity etcetera (406H).
He, as can be seen from the quote below, is also clearly aware of the
realities of our language as inherently representational.
To bring language as language to language... Our proposed way to
language is woven into a speaking that would like to liberate nothing else than
language, liberate it in order to present it, giving utterance to it as
something represented--which straightway testifies to the fact that language itself
has woven us into its speaking (398H).
The representational taste to his formula for this Way-making of
language is cited as evidence that we are deep within the Weft that is
language. Despite the inescapable
representational identity of our language H is confident that his path will
steer clear of this very pitfall. And I
want to contend that H does tread the dangerous path representation for a time
as a part of his Way to language.
This is an important point at which I believe W would take great issue
with H. W's concerns would be to
ascertain just how it is that H will avoid the pitfall to which he here alludes
and nevertheless blithely follows.
Language evolved from use and our language has an
underlying theoretical framework of which we are not always aware -- to these
things both H and W agree. Just as
induction is a part of our everyday and unreflective awareness so too are other
pervasive theoretical frameworks that permeate our language (p113W). Wittgenstein is very careful about these
hidden assumptions that arise from the evolution of our language and
continually uses this knowledge as an important tool in divining important
mistakes of thought.
The primitive forms of our language - noun, adjective
and verb - show the simple picture to which it tries to make everything conform
(p278).
Philosophy is a battle
against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language (p282W).
This as I have said before is certainly not outside of H's thoughts as
he undertakes his Way to language but he does seem to think that his
undertaking somehow avoids this 'bewitchment' that W so sternly warns about.
If we are on the trail of language as language,... We can no longer root
about for general notions like energy, activity, labour, force of spirit, view
upon the world, or expression, under which we might subsume language as a
particular instance of this or that universal. Instead of explaining language
as this or that, and thus fleeing from it, the way to language wants to let
language be experienced as language. True in the essence of language, language
is grasped conceptually; but it is caught in the grip of something other than
itself (406H).
How is it that notions like energy and activity are excluded as a means
of grasping language yet essence is not? This thing 'other than itself' of which language is in
the-grip-of with respect to essence is unclear and only becomes clear
much later in the text. Bear with me as
I follow in H's footsteps.
Such way-making brings language (the essence of language) as language
(the saying) to language (to the resounding word) (418H).
It seems as though every attempt to represent language needs the learned
knack of dialectic in order to master the tangle. However, such a procedure, which the formula formidably provokes,
bypasses the possibility that by remaining on the trail--that is to say, by
letting ourselves be guided expressly into the way-making movement--we may yet
catch a glimpse of the essence of language in all its simplicity, instead of
wanting to represent language (419H).
This path no longer is a merely a formula for deriving the essence of
language representationally for this is an impossible venture that requires
"the learned knack of dialectic in order to master the tangle". Instead, the path reveals itself to be the form
within which the essence of language 'makes its way' upon the back of
propriation (419H). So, this point is
the ultimate transformation of the way to language. Finally H heeds advice, (not unlike the advice W would have
given), that the journey on the way to language is now a Way-making and it is
to be followed as a path that is already made -- no longer do we clear the path
ourselves as representation. Here,
finally we can see how it is that the 'essence' of language differs so much
from the other concepts that H describes as grasping language as one universal
or another. It is in the Way-making in
the grasp of propriation which is "The Saying" that the essence of language
comes forth. To H this does not mean
that the path up until now was fruitless or
return to artefact links
. . . the
bombs were dropped in Japan, so it feels like the end of the world. From now on I believe the personal will
forever be at war with the public. If
we can rationalize this we can rationalize anything (292).
I believe this quotation from The English
Patient to be the key to the moral doctrine of thoughtful, self-authority
within Michael Ondaatje’s Novel. This
doctrine is revealed by a powerful and personal ‘moment’ brought about by an
important event in one way or another for all of the characters within this
narrative. This ‘moment’ is the point
at which we become aware of this ability we have to rationalize anything.
Kip’s ‘moment’ begins when he learns of the bombing of Japan:
American, French, I
don’t care. When you start bombing the
brown races of the world, you’re an Englishman (287).
And Hana’s moment occurs while she sweats and toils
over the bodies of the wounded:
I know death now,
David, I know all the smells, I know how to divert them from agony. When to give the quick jolt of morphine in a
major vein. The saline solution. To make them empty their bowels before they
die. Every damn general should have had
my job. Every damn general. It should have been a prerequisite for any
river crossing. I could never believe
in all those services they gave for the dead.
Their vulgar rhetoric. How dare
they! How dare they talk like that
about a human being dying (84).
Almsay’s ‘moment’ no doubt came long before the
English denied him a jeep to rescue his love.
He had learned to love the desert and its ability to wipe away the lines
of nations. Clearly Madox had been
transformed by his ‘moment’ when he shot himself through the heart during a
pro-war mass in his community church.
Carvaggio clearly has passed through this experience as well and always
sees his life-circumstance through this ‘moment’, an experience that is like a
tinted lens, as we can see from what he says to Hana and Kip:
“Why are you not
smarter? It’s only the rich who can’t
afford to be smart. They’re
compromised. They got locked years ago
into privilege. They have to protect
their belongings. No one is meaner than
the rich. Trust me. But they have to follow the rules of their
shitty civilised world. They declare
war, they have honour, and they can’t leave.
But you two. We three. We’re free (123).
The
English Patient is devoid of moralizing about nations. Rather, it focusses upon the moral quandary
of war in general. It has an
interestingly unique view on World War II, with not a single reference to the
Nazis or war-crimes. Unlike other
novels this one is not concerned with the modern preoccupation of recollecting
history by cursing the loser and acclaiming the winner, it is not concerned
with denouncing the Germans nor is it wrapped up in rationalizing the bombing
of Japan. This is indeed a description
of history to which we are not accustomed, through the eyes of individual experiences not the experiences
of countries, the events are not staged by armies and generals but by people
whose lives are irrevocably altered.
This field
of moral narrative is a burgeoning young field, but its roots go back many
centuries. It is a fairly recent
phenomena indicative of the modern age in which moral doctrines are described
and delimited in only abstract notions and concepts. Ondaatje’s novel is a hearkening back to older times when
morality was something contained within a legend or a myth, not dry abstract
universal concepts, meant to justly govern the whole gamut of human
interactions. Kant is one such moral philosopher. His maxims are meant to be universal. Many traditional interpretations of his moral doctrine show that
his system is incapable of dealing with simple dilemmas. For example, Kant’s system is usually
interpreted as containing maxims prohibiting lying. Thus, the Dutch citizen harbouring a Jewish family in her attic
would be required to tell the truth if asked, “are there any Jews in your
house”. The consequence of adhering to
Kant’s system would be to condemn the Jewish family to death, naturally this
runs counter intuitive to most of us, but it is an interesting example of the
way universal principles can play havoc on our ‘sense’ of justice.
Our
‘sense’ of justice seems to be a very key element of what moral systems we
adopt, as individuals anyway. Certainly
logic must play into this ‘sense’ but perhaps only to the extent that the
doctrine being investigated must be based in the reality of cause and
effect. That is we should not have moral
doctrines that claim 2 + 2 = 5. Nor
should we place the value of bundles of sticks above the lives of humans. In logic we use abstract symbols to
represent propositions and arguments.
Often when logicians are stuck, a proof leads them to absurd conclusions
no matter how often they examine and reexamine the terms and symbols of the
arguments, the best solution is to translate the symbols into plain language
and the solution or the problem becomes obvious. We have an intuitive understanding of arguments that do not
readily extend to high levels of abstraction.
Consider the following discussion on the marriage between moral
intuition and theory by James Rachels in Applied Ethics: A Reader
(hereafter AE):
It is one of the
great virtues of John Rawls work that this methodological issue is out in the
open. Rawls explicity endorses the idea
of using one’s moral intuition as check-points for testing the acceptability of
theory. Moral theory, he has said, is
like linguistics. Just as a linguistic
theory should reflect the competent speaker’s sense of grammaticalness, a moral
theory should reflect the competent moral judge’s sense of rightness (AE 114).
This strong position held by Rawls is not
always readily applicable and perhaps for convenience he tends at times to
‘back off a bit’. The weaker sense of
this position involves a sort of “reflective equilibrium” with the theoretical
pronouncements, whatever that means (AE 114).
Rachels point in this discussion is that oft times theory is plagued
with what he calls “Moorean Insulation”.
Whereby a set of first-order beliefs are held to be absolutely true and
the starting point of knowledge (let us call this ‘safe’ philosophy for the
sake of brevity). This is a quotation
from his book again:
Those who do
philosophy safe proceed in such a way that their first-order beliefs are never
called into doubt. They begin with the
assumption that they know a great many (first-order) things to be true, and for
them, philosophical thinking involves (only?)
A search for principles and theories that would justify and explain what
they already know. Those who do
philosophy with risk, on the other hand, expose their first-order beliefs to
the perils of thought. Everything is up
for grabs. Any belief may have to be
rejected, if reasons are found against it; and one cannot say, in advance, what
reasons might turn up for doubting what beliefs (AE 112).
Clearly
this is a problem. We cannot reasonably
theorize while holding our initial assumptions, superstitions and myths to be
absolute. On the other hand it is
impossible to carry out an enquiry without a first principle that is by
definition unjustified. Attempts to justify
a first principle leads to an infinitely regressive circle of further and
further assumptions that are not justified -- that isn’t much of a choice (AE
116).
And here
we come back to ‘sense’ again. The
moral philosopher must choose some first principle that seems self-evident but
as I have said without any justification.
Take the example of Utilitarians: they have chosen the principle of
action for the maximum happiness and minimum suffering for sentient beings. Unfortunately for the utilitarians we do
appear to have need for, that is, there appears to exist other self-evident
duties -- why chose this one? At this
point Rachels introduces a theory of beliefs called the “web of belief” (118).
If we think of our
moral system as forming part of the web of belief, it is clear, . . . that
there is no firm correlation between what is near the center and what is on the
fringes, on the one hand, and the difference between particular moral beliefs
and general moral principles on the other hand. Some of our moral judgments about particular
cases are near the center of the web. . . . And some of our general principles
are also near the center: for example, that causing pain is wrong. But there are also both general principles
and particular judgments that are nearer the fringes - for example, the
particular judgment that Reagan’s people should not have swapped arms for
hostages is not nearly so certain as the judgment that Manson’s people acted
wrongly . . . (my emphasis, AE 118-9).
What this web of beliefs does for us is allow
the intermingling of various moral principles with moral beliefs that
were previously only linked to a competing (perhaps incommensurable) moral principle.
Thus the grounding or justification of moral principles has “ . . . more to do with showing that one’s total set
of beliefs form a consistent and satisfying whole than with proving that one’s
ultimate principles are true” (AE 120).
What will
this web do for Caravaggio?
Rationalization is still possible, perhaps rationalizing ‘anything’
would be even easier with a complex interwoven system of beliefs and
principles. Who could make sense of it
all? Our heros in the novel are not
convinced. Everywhere I look I see
people experiencing this same ‘moment’.
Cynical attitudes are ubiquitous save perhaps on the evening news. What should happen if this attitude spreads
to the bulk of the population as it appears to be doing (one does not need a
war to experience this ‘moment’)? And
even if wars are essential for this transformation of values there are plenty
to go around.
The
solution, I think, is in the final chapter of this novel where Kip is happily
well adjusted in his homeland surrounded by people he loves in the company of
those he chooses to be with. He has
discovered, understood or uncovered his needs, his desires, that which he truly
wants and those things which bother, annoy and enrage him. By knowing himself he has found a way to
live, happily (affirmatively), even in a world where anything can be
rationalized. This is what
Schopenhauer calls the ‘Acquired
Character’ and he says of it:
We obtain this only
in life, through contact with the world, and it is this we speak of when anyone
is praised as a person who has character, . . . although a man is always the same,
he does not always understand himself, but often fails to recognize himself
until he has acquired some degree of real self-knowledge (WWR sect 55 p
305).
Kip has this sort of character, he was picked
by the Major and his wife because his character would allow him to deal with
bombs critically. Defusing a bomb is no
simple mechanical task. It involves
understanding the designer of the device (189,192). Lord Suffold, and also Kip by implication, was described as
autodidactic, meaning self taught but also morally instructive. All of these personas have a strongly
developed mode of Schopenhauer’s ‘acquired character’ this is what gives them
the resolve to experience their individual ‘moments’. It is through the individuals development of their own character
that they can achieve a spiritual and moral self-authority. Nietzsche (you cannot really speak about
Nietzsche without Schopenhauer) has an idea very much like Rachels’ web, it is
called the veil of Maya. This
veil contains all of our perceptions, thoughts and concepts, these are all
illusory. Picture a world that is
constantly becoming not being. Forces
are the smallest components of objects, not atoms. Beings then are a mere equilibrium of forces which appear
concrete to us but are always changing, ebbing and flowing. Truth would clearly be a dynamic vector of
forces just like all other beings, but without matter to ground it in corporeal
form. Thus, truth is something which
you can attain perhaps but by the time you have grasped it, it has already
changed. This is Nietzsche’s veil of
Maya. We merely impose static
representations upon a world of constant flux.
All is flux all is interpretation of the dynamic as something
static.
Nietzsche
also said that God is dead, so there is no one to whom we can appeal for our
truths. There are many symbols of the
death of God in this novel, including the death of the ‘Holy Trinity’. This is the nickname for the group
consisting of Lord Suffolk, his wife, and his assistant. They died because a bomb they tried to
defuse turned out to be of a clever design, very difficult to diffuse. This is a metaphor for the death of God at
the hands of rationality (191, 178).
The scarecrow in Hana’s garden is made from a crucifix. Christian morality is here used for more
practical and seemingly more effective purposes. Instead of scaring people away from sin it is used for scaring
crows from eating grain (207). And
finally when Kip hides his phosphorous watch in the cupboard that holds a saint
so Hana does not detect him in the dark.
The Saints are as dead and blind as statues (221).
Thus
clearly Nietzsche has a different interpretation of the world from Rachels but
these both amount to the same thing, truth is unattainable. For Nietzsche this means accepting the
‘moment’ which all of the characters of our novel have experienced, and using
that personal experience to realize, morality is not absolute. Our norms are not absolute nor do our laws
come down from heaven as eternal truth.
To live peacefully and safely with others we must have regulations and
norms of conduct but there is no reason to believe these norms appeal to the
truth, that they are the universal moral values. They are merely practical principles to facilitate civilisation.
For
Nietzsche, everything is interpretation.
Hence the importance of self-authority and ‘acquired character’:
Will to truth is a
making firm, a making true and durable an abolition of the false character of
things, a reinterpretation of it into beings.
“Truth” is therefore not something there, that might be found or
discovered -- but something that must be created and that gives a name to a
process, or rather to a will to overcome that has in itself no end --
introducing truth, as a processus in infinitum, an active determining --
not a becoming-conscious of something that is in itself firm and
determined. It is a word for the “will
to power” (my emphasis; Will to Power sect 552).
In a world in which all is interpretation, the
way you go about interpreting facts, knowledge and truth are infinitely
important. Nietzsche attempts to give
the individual the authority and the strength to undertake this personal
interpretive process, through self-knowledge.
All of Ondaatje’s characters to one degree or another have discovered
that truth is interpretive, only Kip has made
Bibliography
Ondaatje, Michael., The English Patient,
Vintage Books Canada Edition 1993, Toronto.
Rachels, James., “Moral Philosophy as a Subversive
Activity” in Applied Ethics: A Reader, Winkler,
Earl R. & Coombs, Jerrold R. (eds), Blackwell Pub., 1993, Cambridge USA.
Nietzsche, Friedrich., The Will To Power, Ed.
W. Kaufmann, Trans. W. Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale,
Vintage Books Edition 1968, New York.
Nietzsche, Friedrich., The Gay Science, Trans.
W. Kaufmann, Vintage Books Edition 1974, New York.
Nietzsche, Friedrich., Thus Spoke Zarathustra,
Trans. R.J. Hollingdale, Penguin Books 1969, England.
Nietzsche, Friedrich., Ecce Homo, Trans. R.J.
Hollingdale, Penguin Books 1992,
England.
Nietzsche, Friedrich., Beyond Good and Evil,
Trans. R.J. Hollingdale, Penguin Books 1990, England.
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